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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

JERROLD L. DAVIS dba
JERRY DAVIS AND ASSOCIATES,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
HEATH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a corporation,
dba PIONEER TRAILER PARK, SANDRA H. FLINDERS,
KATHRYN B. HEATH, DOROTHY A. HOUSLEY,
BONNIE J. BRINTON, HELEN YOUNG, MARY FRANCIS
BENNION, LAWRENCE T. HEATH, CAROLYN H. MARLER,
NANCY H. FERRIN,

RESPONDENTS' BR]
Case No. 1454S

Defendants-Appellants.
DOROTHY A. HOUSLEY AND BONNIE J. BRINTON,
Cross-Complainants-Respondents,
vs
HEATH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a corporation,
dba PIONEER TRAILER PARK,
Cross-Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover a real estate commission by
the Plaintiff, a duly licensed real estate broker, pursuant to
a 90-day Listing Agreement entered into between the Plaintiff
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and the Defendant, HEATH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, on November 13,
1973, which Agreement was approved and endorsed by substantially
all of the stockholders of the company at a subsequent meeting
held November 19, 1973.

(See Exhibit IP). The Listing Agreement

is on the printed form used for many years and approved by the
Salt Lake Real Estate Board (See Exhibit 2).

Objections to said

Listing Agreement were not made until after the acceptance of an
offer to purchase signed by all of the Directors of the defendant
corporation.
Plaintiff contends a bona fide offer to purchase was presented and accepted by the Defendant, Heath Development Company, and
approved at a meeting where all of the Directors were present,
and said offer and acceptance were within the 90-day Listing Agreement.

The offer and acceptance allowed the purchasers 90 days, or

until May 1st, to arrange financing.

(See Plaintiffs Exhibit 3).

The record and testimony of all the witnesses called shows
conclusively that the Defendant and all members of this family
corporation had tried to sell the property for years; that the
main topic of conversation at almost every stockholders1 meeting
was in substance that all of the stockholders were getting along
in years and unless the property was sold soon, each stockholder
would soon be dead or too old to enjoy any return from the property (Tr. 148 and following).
-2-
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The foregoing facts were all established by documents
signed by the parties and the signatures are acknowledged as
genuine.

The Plaintiff secured the financing but the Defend-

ants refused to perform prior to the expiration of the time
for the execution of the documents and the actual consummation
of the transaction.
Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to the six percent
(6%) commission, plus costs and expenses, including a reasonable
attorneys1 fee, because he performed his services and Defendants
breached said contract by refusing to complete the transaction•
Plaintiff admits the signatures of Etelen Young and Mary
Francis Bennion were signed by their mother, Essie Heath, now
deceased, and the signature of Lawrence T. Heath was signed by
Carolyn

Marler.

But the Heath Development Company has been

operated over the years in a very informal and unorthodox ..manner,
more like a partnership than a corporation, so far as management
is concerned, and the objection was not timely made but only
after the refusal to complete the sale.
Jurisdiction is not in dispute.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Statement found in Defendants1 Brief as to the disposition
in the lower Court is correct.
-3-

Also, the statement of the relief

-4-

sought by Defendant, Heath Development Company, is substantially
correct.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT WAS ENTERED INTO BY ALL OF THE
PARTIES PRESENT, WHICH CONSTITUTED OVER 80% OF THE STOCK AND
WAS ACTED UPON BY PLAINTIFF IN GOOD FAITH.
The statement that the January 13, 1973, Earnest Money
Agreement was never properly signed or accepted by a properly
constituted quorum of Heath Development Company and the contract
created is voidable, is not at all accurate and does not apply
to the facts of this case.
This was and is a family corporation with members all related.

Business was carried on in a very informal fashion.

(See Exhibit 4, indicating the easy, informal manner in which
the business of the family corporation was conducted and business
was transacted.)
In the case of Grover vs. Garn, 23 Utah 2d, page 441, Judge
Faux stated at pages 445-6, as follows:
"So we have the owners of substantially all of the
stock of the corporation who were also the owners of
the land before it came into the corporation as its
primary asset, acting without the formality of a stockholders1 meeting or a written resolution in selling the
primary asset of the corporation. More, they agreed in
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the sale, that all payments should go from the buyers
to Mr. and Mrs. Grover individually and to turn over
the Garns property of Mr. Grover consisting of shares
of water stock and rights for grazing cattle under
the U. S. Taylor Grazing Act. While this latter facet
of the whole contract may be termed a maverick and concededly not a model for all corporate dealings yet as
tendered in defense by the Garn defendants and respondents we are not concerned here with a corporation
having a multitude of stockholders situated over a
wide expanse of the country. The two owners signed
as vice president and secretary-treasurer of the seller corporation on October 1, 1964. While we do not
approve the method employed here and certainly denounce
it as a pattern to be followed by corporations generally, we cannot disagree in this instance with the
statement of law:
"***but the trend of authority is to uphold as
binding on the corporation acts or contract on its
behalf by a person or persons owning all or practically
all of the stock."
It is stated in 18 Am Jur 2d, page 97, Section 485 as follows:
"The acts or contracts of persons owning all or
practically all of the stock of a corporation are
binding on the corporation, at least where the
rights of creditors of the corporation would
not be prejudiced thereby. The unanimous action
of all the stockholders may be binding as to
them and the corporation, even though there was
no formal meeting or no action by the Board of
Directors. Contracts by a sole stockholder may
be ratified by the Directors.*
It is stated in 19 Am Jur 2d, pages 639-640, Section 1227,
as follows:

-5-

"While a charter or statutory provision under
which officers have power to convey is of course
binding, the Board of Directors, in the absence
of any charter or statutory limitation, has full
authority to effectuate the corporation's power
to convey the corporate realty and may authorize
the officers to execute a conveyance thereof or
make a contract for its sale. It has been held
that express authority to sell real estate carries with it authority to make a contract for
its sale. * * *•
Now counsel cites Runswick vs. FloorU6ut 91, 208 P2d
949 (1949) and cites this language:
"So long as corporate officers act fairly
and in good faith, they are not precluded
from dealing or contracting with the corporation merely because they are officers."
This is certainly our case where business is conducted as
herein stated by a small, informal group of family members. As
to the balance of the quotation cited concerning a "disinterested quorum being present, that certainly is not this case and
does not apply here.
Again counsel cites the case Fay L. Branch vs. Western
Factors Inc. et al vs. Arnel Heaps 28 Ut 2d 361-501 P2d 570,
with the point that a director occupies a fiduciary relationship
to the corporation, and his personal dealings with the corporation may be avoided unless good faith and fairness are shown.
Mr. Justice Ellett in the opinion states as follows:
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"Where as in the execution of a trust deed here
under consideration, there is an entire absence of a
want of good faith, fraud and collusion, and the corporation is yet a going concern, no sound principle
of law prohibits a stockholder or director from dealing with the corporation. A corporation is an artificial entity, and one of the principal objects of
its creation is to contract with individuals in due
course of business. This it may <$o with its directors and stockholders as well as w^.th others; and
under the weight of American authority, at least,
contracts made by the corporation with its officers
are not void per se, but at most Voidable merely,
at the election of the corporation or its representatives, within a reasonable time."
Plaintiff, of course, has no quarrel with Judge Ellett's
opinion herein stated, except that the tfacts in that case are
entirely different and therefore have ndthina whatsoever to do
with the case at bar.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THE VALIDITY OF THE
CONTRACT AGREEMENT BECAUSE OF A TECHNICALITY IN THE PROCEDURE
AS SET FORTH IN THE STATUTE, ESPECIALLY A SMALL FAMILY CORPORATION OF THIS KIND.
It is stated in 19 C.J.S. at pages 714-15, as follows:
"Each party to a corporate contract may be ee*~
topped to set up that the corporation neglected to
observe some regulation that it should have observed
before entering into the transaction.
"Where an act done is within ihe corporate
powers, and both parties to the transaction have
proceeded as if all preliminary formalities had
been complied with, and rights have attached,
each party is estopped to set up, with a view
-7-
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of defeating the rights of the other, that the
corporation neglected to observe some regulation
that it should have observed before entering into the transaction. So, in general, a person
dealing with one who is a proper officer to execute a corporate contract is entitled to assume
that such officer is acting regularly, and that
all formalities of acts of the corporation and
its affairs on which the right to execute the
contract is conditioned have been performed,
and the rights of such person will not be affected because they have not been performed.
A corporation will not be allowed to defend
against an action on its contract on the ground
that the provisions of its charter or a governing statute were not complied with, if it has
received the consideration from the other party,
particularly where the act was with the knowledge
and consent of its stockholders. A corporation's
successor, which receives the benefit of its contract, is estopped from denying its liability
thereon."
In Taylor vs. Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co. 148 ALR 834#
295 Ky 226, 173 SW 2d 377, it is said:
"The action of directors, when exercised in
good faith and not in fraud of the rights of the
stockholders, is not subject to the latter1s control, and will not be interfered with by the
Courts."
In the case of Peterson vs. Holmgren Land &
Livestock Company, 12 Utah 2nd 12 5, 363 P2d 786 (1961) the Court
held:
"Wade C. J. A contract for the sale of
realty was enforceable against corporate vendor,
even if the minutes of the Board of Directors
were insufficient to show express authorization,
where the corporation was a family corporation,
-8-
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articles provided for acquirement and alienation
of realty and there was binding ostensible authority in its president."
13 Am. Jr. Sec. 890, pp. 871-72, states:
"If a corporate officer assuming to contract
on behalf of the corporation is one to whom authority to make such a contract m^y be given, a
person dealing with him in good f^ith is not affected by the fact that the proper steps to clothe
him with were not taken."
Again in 19 Am. Jr. Sec. 1164, p. 590, the same
principle is stated:
"The fundamental and well-settled rule is
that when, in the usual course of the business
of a corporation, an officer or other agent is
held out by the corporation or has been permitted
to act for it or manage its affairs in such a way
as to justify third persons who deal with him in
inferring or assuming that he is doing an act or
making a contract within the scope of his authority, the corporation is bound thereby, even
though such officer or agent has riot the actual
authority from the corporation to do such an act
or make such a contract. This authority is known
as apparent or ostensible authority. This apparent authority is materially the same and is
based upon the same principles as authority by
estoppel. Stating the rule in terms of estoppel,
a corporation, which, by its voluntary act,
places an officer or agent in such a position or
situation that persons of ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages and tihe nature of
the particular business, are justified in assuming that he has authority to perform the act in
question and deal with him upon that assumption,
is estfcpped as against such persons from denying
the officerfs or agent's authority."
-9-
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In the case of Baker vs. Glenwood Mining Co., 82 Utah 100,
21 P2d 889, Justice Folland stated at page 107 the following:
"This Court is committed to the doctrine that
where a corporation has received the benefits of a
contract, and while it still retains the fruits
thereof, it will be estopped from urging as a defense that the contract was ultra vires the corporation or the corporate officers were without authority with respect thereto."
See also Zions Savings Bank & Trust Co., vs. Tropic &
East Rock Irr. Co., 102 Utah, 101, 126 P2d 1053.
POINT III
THE CORPORATE ENTITY IN THE CASE AT BAR WITH ITS SMALL, INFORMAL
FAMILY GROUP ACTED PROPERLY AND THE COURT CONSIDERED THE SALE
PROPER.
In the case of Shaw vs. Bailey-McCune Company, et al.f
11 Utah 2d page 93, Justice Callister states at page 95:
"Under some circumstances the corporate entity may
be disregarded in the interest of justice in such cases
as fraud, contravention of law or contract, or public
wrong. * * *.
"Moreover, the conditions under which the corpor=
ate entity may be disregarded or the corporation be
regarded as the alter ego of the stockholders vary
according to the circumstances in each case inasmuch as the doctrine is essentially an equitable
one and for that reason is particularly within the
province of the trial court."
It is stated in 9 ALR 2d at page 1309, as follows:
"Quite naturally it has been held — in fact
no other conclusion would seem logical—that a corporation created under corporate reorganization
statutes with a view to ultimate liquidation of
-10-

the corporation, and operated in the meantime for the purpose of salvaging whatever
amounts it can for the benefit of bondholders or creditors may sell all the assets of the corporation.
"For the convenience of the user examples of the tests of the types of legislative
enactments characteristic of those found in
the cases herein discussed are presented herewith:
"No corporation shall sell. . . . all or
substantially all of the property and assets
. . . unless under authority of a resolution
of its Board of Directors arid with the approval of the principal terms of the transaction and the nature and amount of the consideration by vote or written consent of (the)
shareholders." See Jeppi v. Brockman Holding
Co. (1949) 34 Cal 2d (Adv 10) 206 P2d 847,
9 ALR 2d 1297.
"Every corporation may, by a vote of the
majority of the stock entitled to vote, sell
and convey or authorize to be conveyed, all or
any portion of the property owned by it, or
mortgage or lease any such property whenever
it shall be necessary for its business or the
protection or benefit of its property.* See
Fontaine v. Brown County Motors Co., (1947X
251 Wis. 433, 29 NW 2d 744, 174 ALR 694."
In Union Trust Co. vs. Carter (Fed.) supra,
it appeared that a corporation was formed, by
the charter of which it was provided that the
stockholders thereof might not vote, or control
the management of the corporation in any way,
the entire control thereof being delegated to.
the directors, who were given power to do all
that the stockholders might ordinarily do. The
directors of the corporation, which had been
-11-
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formed to sell certain property sold all of
its property to a fellow director. The complainant , a stockholder, thereupon sought to
enjoin the transfer of the property to a
vendee. It was held that since the stockholders
had provided rules for the management of the corporation they must be guided thereby, and that,
since the sale in question was a matter coming
within the provision, the stockholders of the
corporation were necessarily bound. The result
of the by-law was to authorize the directors to
sell the property.J?
It is stated in 5 ALR page 930-931 as follows:
"Where a corporation is a going and solvent
concern, and has corporate power to sell its property in the ordinary course of the corporate
business, the directors may make such sales without the consent of the stockholders. Buell v.
Buckingham (1864) 16 Iowa 284, 85 Am. Dec. 516;
McCloskey v. New Orleans Brewing Co. (1911) 128
La. 197, 54 So. 738. And see the reported case
(Hendren v. Neeper, ante, 927) .
"The directors are ordinarily intrusted with
the management of the corporate business. McCloskey
v. New Orleans Brewing Co. (La.) Supra, wherein
it was said that stockholders cannot take.the
business out of the hands of the Board of Directors
without very good cause.'"
POINT IV
THERE IS NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF PLAINTIFF
AS BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT.
There is no conflict of interest on the part of Plaintiff
as between Plaintiff and Defendant.

All four of the Directors

were aware of and knew the terms of the Listing Agreement and
-12-
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knew the signing of the Earnest Money Agreement would make the
Corporation obligated to pay the real estate commission according to the terms of the Listing Agreement.

The four individuals

also were the holders of over eighty percent (80%) of the voting
stock of the Corporation.
Upon signing the Earnest Money Agreement a valid contract
was created.

The Plaintiff had earned his commission and was

entitled to be paid providing the purchasers could come up with
the money within the allotted time. All parties, corporation,
and otherwise, knew Plaintiff would work to arrange financing
(Ex. 3). Plaintiff was able to do this (Tr. 15-26) where the
bank representative testified a loan had been approved that
would enable purchasers to comply with the Earnest Money Agreement.

Only at that late date did the Defendant refuse to exe-

cute the deed and thereby breached its contract with Plaintiff.
It may be noted here that a son-in-law of the President of the
Corporation who owned no voting stock and whose wife owned less
than one share of stock, instructed the President of the Corporation what to do.

In fact, the evidence indicated his action

could be described as intimidating.

No cbrporation meeting had

been held to determine that the contract betwen the Plaintiff
and the Defendant should be breached or tfrat the contract was
to be voided.

This was simply an arbitrary breach of contract
-13-
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induced by a relative who had no direct interest in the Corporation as a stockholder or officer.

The nearest thing to an

interest on the part of Mr. Flinders would be to keep the property in the Corporation until his wife inherited the interest of
the President of the Corporation.
The contract between Plaintiff and Defendant was not one
with conflict of interest problems and was not void or voidable.
The Plaintiff acted in complete candor and good faith, and full
disclosures were made at all times. There is no tint of bad
faith or any improperactivity on the part of the Plaintiff.
If the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant can be ignored and broken, then it is difficult to conceive of a real
estate sale where the seller could not break the Agreement with
impunity.

All of the cases cited by the Defendant go to the

question of the rights as between seller and purchaser, but not
to the obligation of the Defendant to the Plaintiff.
If the Heath family here involved wished to impune the
motives of each other, the law does not require that plaintiff
be denied its proper compensation.

The Plaintiff has fully per-

formed and complied with the terms of its contract with the Defendant and is entitled to be paid.

There is no conflict of

interest as between Plaintiff and Defendant.
-14-
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One hundred percent (100%) of the Directors and in excess
of eighty percent (80%) of the stockholders approved the contract to sell, and both the Corporation and the individuals involved approved the original Listing Agreement.

All of the

stockholders and directors approved the Listing Agreement (Ex.1).
Again, in the case cited above, Taylor vs. Axton-Fisher
Tobacco Company, the Court said:
"If in a particular instancy where the action
taken by directors creates rights in another, they
cannot thereafter alter or affect those rights to
his prejudice."
Central Idaho Agency, Inc. v. Clara Turner, 92 Idaho 306
442 P2d p. 442:
"Pursuant to terms of exclusive Listing Agreement contract Plaintiff broker in suit for commission would be entitled to Summary Judgment
against land owner only if it were conclusively
established that Plaintiff produced buyer ready,
willing and able to purchase th0 realty under
terms authorized by the Agreement or under terms
acceptable to the Defendant. * * *."
McMenamin v. Bishop, 6 Washington Appeals 455, 493 Pac.2d
1016:
"Exclusive real estate Listing Agreement providing that vendor would be liable to broker for
the commission if she withdrew the broker's authority prior to expiration of listing, was a bilateral contract. Thus, where broker made bona
fide and continuous effort to procure purchaser
by advertising the property approximately 17 times
-15-
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in local newspaper and showing the property to six
or seven prospective purchasers, vendor was liable
for the commission when she refused to complele sales
transaction even if she had revoked the Agreement."
Hoyt vs. Wasatch Homes, 1 Ut 2d, p. 9, 261 Pac.2d 927:
"That Agreement certainly contemplates that
the Plaintiff would cooperate in good faith toward
the accomplishment of the purpose for which he employed Defendant. He cannot be permitted to procure them to obtain a buyer on terms acceptable to
the Plaintiff and then prevent the accomplishment
of what he requested and authorized them to do by
arbitrarily refusing to perform his part of the
transaction. Under such circumstances he will
not be heard to complain of their failure to do
that which he prevented."
Sargent vs. Ritchey 233 Pac.2d 1619 (Washington):
"Unless the broker or his employer have expressly stipulated to the contrary, the broker is
entitled to his compensation upon the completion
of the negotiations he undertook irrespective of
whether or not the contract negotiated is ever
actually consummated, so long as the failure to
carry it through to a successful completion is
not due to any fault of the broker."
SUMMARY
The Plaintiff in this case acted in good faith, performed
the service for which he was hired and the duly elected, qualified and acting Board of Directors engaged him to so perform.
The fact that some of the officers had sellers1 remorse or
thought they could make a better deal some place else has no
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place in the law.
It should be noted that over 80% of jthe stock was represented at the meeting on January 13, 1974^ wnen the Earnest
Money Agreement was approved.

The sale, ^o far as the Plaintiff

herein was concerned, was completed and his commission earned.
The financing was approved as shown by th^ testimony (Tr. p.71-72),
before the deadline as provided in the Agreement.

This, there-

fore, appears to be a simple case of a seller*' remorse and the
stockholders in this family corporation backing out of an agreement after the Plaintiff had completed anc$ fulfilled his part
of the contract, and Plaintiff should therefore recover his commission as prayed for in his Complaint.
The Listing Agreement was in conformity with the requirements of the Articles of Incorporation, ar|d was also approved
at a meeting of substantially all of the Stockholders.
The authority to sell the property off a corporation by its
Directors has long been the law of Utah.

As early as 1919 in

the case of Beggs vs. Myton Canal & Irr. do., 54 Utah 120, 179
Pac. 984, the Court said, at Page 125-6:
"* * * Considering the selction as a whole,
the manifest legislative intent is that all
corporations in this State ma^, through their
directors and upon confirmation by a vote of
a majority in amount of the outstanding stock,
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dispose of the corporate property when such
disposition is not provided for in the Articles
of Incorporation. And when the Articles of Incorporation provide that the property of the
corporation may be sold by the directors or by
the stockholders, sales made in accordance with
such provision will be binding upon the corporation. Whether such corporation be organized for
mining purposes, or for other purposes, under the
general incorporation laws of the State, our
statute gives private corporations the power to
sell and dispose of their property upon confirmation by the majority in amount of the outstanding stock. No further authority need be invoked
in this case. The rule, however, is well settled
that failing or unsuccessful corporations may
sell and dispose of their property provided the
transactions are not in fraud of the rights of
creditors."
It should also be noted that all of the qualified directors
were present at the time the Earnest Money Agreement was executed.

It has been admitted that Sandra Flinders did not own

one share of common stock as required by the Articles of Incorporation and there had been no actual transfer of a share to
her on the books of the Corporation.
It would therefore appear to Plaintiff that this is a
simple case of sellers changing their minds or backing out of
the deal after the Plaintiff had performed all of his part of
the Listing and Earnest Money Agreements for the sale of the
property.
Mrs. Heath, herself, on cross examination, admitted that
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her only reason for refusing to sigri the deeds was some second
thoughts which she had after talking) to the husband of Sandra
Flinders at the time she, Mrs. Flinders, owned less than one
full share.

(Tr. 8), and Mr. Flinders owned no voting stock.

We therefore submit that the Judgment should be affirmed.
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